Abstract-A decision maker (Actor) has to decide which of several available resources to use in the presence of an adversary (Controller) that can prevent the Actor of receiving information on the state of some of the resources. The Controller has a limitation on the amount of information it can conceal. We formulate this problem as a game and compute the most harmful behavior of the Controller and the best choice of a resource for the Actor. We identify cases in which the exact solution is computationally intractable, and provide approximate solutions with polynomial complexity.
I. INTRODUCTION
We consider a system with two adversarial entities. The system's state is a random vector of dimension n. At a given time the first entity (Controller) has complete state information. It can then hide some information from the second entity (Actor). The latter then choosses one of the n entries of the vector (which may correspond to a resource) based on the information revealed by the controller. We devise a framework that enables the Controller to decide the information it would conceal and the Actor to determine its actions.
As an example, consider a transmitter that has access to n channels, whose qualities constitute the state. It needs to select one channel for transmission, and the transmission quality of the selected channel determines the rate of successful transmission. It probes the channels in order to assess their qualities before transmission. A jammer seeks to reduce the rate of successful transmission. Jamming is often done by generating signals that interfere with the sender's communication; however the jammer may be able to deteriorate the transmission rate much more by preventing the transmitter from learning the states of the channels by blocking the probe packets. We assume that the jammer knows the channels states and can block the probes in at most k channels. The remaining states are revealed to the transmitter who then selects one channel. It need not select a channel whose state has been revealed since the fact that the jammer has concealed the state of a channel may indicate that its quality is good.
An important challenge in designing a framework for modeling Information Concealing Games (ICG), is that the Actor can learn about the system from not only the information that the Controller reveals, but also from the information that the Controller conceals since the fact that an information has been concealed may provide important insight about its nature.
A related zero-sum repeated game of revealing/concealing information has been considered in [1] . There too, only one player has full state information. However, the informed player does not directly control the information available to the other player. Hiding information has also been studied as a tool for authentication of images or voice files [2] .
II. A MATHEMATICAL FRAMEWORK

A. Terminologies and Solution Concepts
We start by modeling the ICG as a stochastic leader-follower game between two players: the Controller and the Actor.
The System state is an n-dimensional vector X whose entries take values in K = {0, ..., K − 1}. The state space is K n . The random variables corresponding to the components of the state vector may be dependent and can be described by a joint probability distribution β.
Information and Actions of the Controller: The Controller knows the state X. It conceals the values of at most k components of the state from the actor. The controller's action is a subset of N := {1, . . . , n} with cardinality k or lower. Each such action determines a sub-vector of the state with size n − k or more that the actor observes. Let A c ( x) denote the set of all such sub-vectors when the controller's information is x and
Information and Action of the Actor: The Actor knows those components of the state which the Controller does not conceal. Specifically, if c be the action taken by the Controller and the system state is x, then the Actor's information y consists of the sub-vector of x with components in N \ c. Therefore, from its information y, the Actor knows the Controller's action. Let I a be the set of all possible informations of the Actor about the entries of the system state vector. It consists of at least |A c | × K n−k elements. The Actor selects one of the components of the state. N is the set of all actions of the Actor.
Payoff function: If a component of the system state has value i, then the associated expected utility is r(i) such that r(0) < r(1) < . . . < r(K − 1). If the system state is x, and the Actor selects component l, then the payoff for the Actor is r(x l ).
Strategies: Behavioral strategy of a player is a function from its information set to the set of probability measures over its action space. More precisely, the Controller can decide randomly which components to conceal based on the system state vector, and the Actor can randomly select a component based on the revealed sub-vector. Let u (v, resp.) be a behavioral policy of the Controller (Actor, resp.). Then, u( x) (v( y), resp.) is the probability distribution used by the Controller (Actor, resp.) for selecting its actions when its information is x ( y, resp.). Specifically, u( x) y (v( y) i , resp.) is the probability with which the Controller (Actor, resp.) conceals the sub-vector y ∈ A c ( x) (selects the component i ∈ N , resp.) when its information is x ( y, resp.). Let U (V, resp.) be the set of behavioral strategies for the Controller (Actor, resp.).
Pure strategies: Let U p ⊂ U (V p ⊂ V, resp.) be the set of pure (deterministic) behavioral policies for the Controller (Actor, resp.). A Controller's pure policy is a function from K n to A c . An Actor's pure policy is a function from I a to N . Mixed strategies: A mixed strategy of a player is a probability measure over its pure policies. Let U M (V M , resp.) be the set of mixed strategies for Controller (Actor, resp.).
Note that behavioral and mixed are alternate representations of the randomized policies of the two players.
Probability space: A joint probability distribution β for the system state vector and strategies u and v for the Controller and Actor, resp., define a probability P u,v β measure over the state, actions and informations of the two players. Let E u,v β be the corresponding expectation operator.
Utilities: When the Actor's information is y, the Controller and the Actor use (behavioral or mixed) strategies u and v resp., and the joint probability distribution of the system states is β, the Actor's utility J
where Y a is the random information of the Actor, X i is the ith component of the random system state vector, B is the action of the Actor. Hence, X B is the random state of the component which is chosen possibly in a random way by the Actor. When the system state vector is x, and the Controller and the Actor use (behavioral or mixed) strategies u and v resp., the Controller's utility J ( y) among all strategies v of the Actor. In our wireless example, the system state vector constitutes the states of the channels, each channel can be in K states, and r(i) is the expected rate of successful transmission of the transmitter (Actor) when it transmits in a channel that is in state i. The jammer's (Controller's) action is to conceal the states some (≤ k) channels and the transmitter's action is to select a channel for transmission. An example of pure behavioral strategy of the jammer (denoted as Greedy for Controller or GC), is to conceal the channels with k-best states, that is, those with k-best expected rates of successful transmission (ties are broken in any pre-determined order). An example of pure policy of the transmitter, (denoted as Best Among Revealed for Actor or BRA), is to select the channel that has the highest state among the revealed channels (ties are broken in any pre-determined order). An example of behavioral policy of the jammer that is not pure is to conceal the states of as many channels that are in state K − 1 as possible, and if fewer than k channels are in state K − 1 then select the remaining channels whose states are to be concealed uniformly among the channels that are not in state K − 1. An example of behavioral policy (called Uniform among Concealed for Actor or UCA) of the transmitter that is not pure is to select a channel uniformly among those whose states are concealed. Next, J u,v c ( x) is the negative of the expected rate of successful transmission of the transmitter when the channel state vector is x and the jammer and transmitter use policies u, v resp. Also, J β,u,v a ( y) is the expected rate of successful transmission of the transmitter when the jammer reveals y to the transmitter, jammer and transmitter use policies u, v resp. and the joint distribution of the channel state vector is β. For example, let u be GC and v be UCA.
If the transmitter uses BRA, GC is the best response of the jammer, and if the state processes of the channels are independent and identically distributed, UCA is the best response of the transmitter against the GC policy of the jammer .
B. Counter-intuitive properties of the Nash equilibrium
The GC policy for the Controller (Sec II-A) may seem to minimizes the efficacy of the Actor and therefore there always exists some policy v * for the Actor such that (GC, v * ) constitutes a point-wise nash equilibrium. We show that this is not the case.
Lemma 2.1: [4] There may not exist any policy v * for the Actor such that (GC, v * ) constitutes a point-wise Nash equilibrium, even in systems where the state processes for different components are mutually independent and identically distributed.
Next, consider a simple policy " Statistically Best for Actor" (SBA) for the Actor under which it decides its action without exploiting any knowledge of the Controller's policy. Specifically it selects the component i for which the expectation of the utility (r(X i )) conditioned on the states of channels whose states have been revealed is the maximum under β (it uses only β and not the Controller's policy in determining the above conditional expectation). For example, when the state processes of all components are mutually independent, K = 2 (i.e., each component has 2 states), if the state of a component that is in state 1 has been revealed, SBA selects the component and otherwise SBA selects the component for which the expected reward is the maximum under the prior distribution β. It may seem that at least in simple special cases, i.e., when K = 2, there always exists some policy u * for the Actor such that (u * , SBA) constitutes a point-wise Nash equilibrium. The following lemma shows that such intuition is founded.
Lemma 2.2: [4]
There may not exist any policy u * for the Controller such that (u * , SBA) constitutes a point-wise Nash equilibrium, even in systems where the state processes for different components are mutually independent and K = 2.
III. FRAMEWORK FOR POINT-WISE EQUILIBRIUM
We identify a zero-sum game such that (u, v) constitutes a point-wise Nash equilibrium in the original game if and only if they constitute a saddle-point in the equivalent game.
A. An equivalent two-person zero-sum game Definition 3.1: Consider a game with two players: the Controller and the Actor. The action of each is to select one of
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its pure behavioral policies in the stochastic leader-follower game. When the players select u, v resp., the utility of the Actor is
where B is the action of the transmitter under u, v and random state vector X. The Actor seeks to maximize its utility and the Controller seeks to minimize the Actor's utility. The game is zero-sum. is denoted as the value of the game. Zero-sum games with finitely many pure strategies for each player have a saddle point within the mixed strategies which can be computed using linear programs (LPs) (see footnote at Section III-B). For each player, there is a one-to-one correspondence between the class of its behavioral and its mixed strategies [3] such that for any policy of the other player, the expected utility under the mixed strategy and the equivalent behavioral one is the same. Thus, a saddle point exists within the behavioral policies as well. 
B. Computation of the saddle point
Saddle point of zero-sum games with finite number of strategies can be computed using LPs whose number of variables is approximately the number of pure strategies of a player and the number of constraints equal the number of pure strategies of the other player.
1 Solving LPs has polynomial complexity in the number of decision variables and constraints. 1 For example, consider a matrix game whose entries are R u,v where player I (minimizing) chooses a row u and player 2 (maximizing) chooses a column v. A saddle point policy for player 2 is obtained by maximizing inf u R u,v .
Then for any u, the value z is smaller than or equal to max v R u,v . Moreover the value is the largest constant with this property. The LP is thus
Nevertheless, the computation is intractable due to the huge number of pure strategies N c of the Controller and N a of the Actor, given by
Simplifying, the number of pure strategies of the Controller (Actor, resp.) in the original game is at least
We shall obtain alternative LPs whose computation times are polynomials in (K n + k) n k . Henceforth, u (v, resp.) are the behavioral policies of the Controller (Actor resp.).
1) Saddle point for the Controller: 
Due to Corollary 3.1, we only need to consider the variables z( y) such that |a( y)| = k. Also, since for any y and x such that y ∈ A c ( x), x i = y i for any i ∈ N \ a( y), for any y, i ∈ N \ a( y), and y i < max j∈N \a( y) y j , the value of the right hand side of the lower bound constraint in LP-CONTROLLER is less than or equal to that for y, l ∈ N \ a( y), and y l = max j∈N \a( y) y j irrespective of the choice of β, u. Thus, these constraints can be ignored as well, and LP-CONTROLLER can be described as follows.
LP-CONTROLLER:
Minimize
Henceforth, we will use this description of LP-CONTROLLER. Note that LP-CONTROLLER has K n n k variables and (k + 1) 
This full text paper was peer reviewed at the direction of IEEE Communications Society subject matter experts for publication in the IEEE INFOCOM 2008 proceedings.
Theorem 3.3: [4]
The solution {v( y) i } i∈N , y∈Ac of LP-ACTOR constitutes the saddle-point policy v * for the Actor. Definition 3.5: A policy v ∈ V of an Actor is said to be sensible if it never selects a component whose state has been revealed and which is in a state that is lower than the highest state among the states of all components whose states have been revealed (i.e., v( y) i = 0 if i ∈ a( y) and y i = max j∈N \a( y) y j ). 
Thus, LP-ACTOR can be re-written as follows.
LP-ACTOR:
Maximize
Henceforth, we consider the above description for LP-ACTOR. LP-ACTOR effectively has K n + k n k variables and
IV. APPROXIMATION WITH POLYNOMIAL COMPLEXITY
We first consider the case where the system consists of few classes of components such that all components in each class are statistically identical and the number of states K is small.
A. Polynomial time computation in systems with constant number of classes and of states
We first formally define the notion of classes of components. Definition 4.1: Let x i,j ∈ K n be obtained by interchanging the ith and the jth components of x ∈ K n . Let y i,j ∈ A c be obtained as follows: a( y, i) be the set of components in class i that have been concealed when the Actor's information is y. Note that
We present a key property of systems with arbitrary number of classes of components.
1) Symmetry among components in the same class: Definition 4.3:
Let u, v be behavioral policies of the Controller and Actor resp. and i, j ∈ N. The mirror image w.r.t (i, j) of the policy u (v, resp.), u i,j (v i,j , resp.) is a policy obtained as follows:
.) treat i as j and j as i. Definition 4.4: A policy u ∈ U (v ∈ V, resp.) is said to be symmetric w.r.t.
.) is said to be symmetric if it is symmetric w.r.t. each pair of components that are in the same class. Let U s ⊂ U and V s ⊂ V be the classes of all symmetric policies of the Controller and Actor resp..
The following theorem shows the existence of a symmetric saddle-point.
Theorem 4.1: [4] There exists a symmetric policy u ∈ U s (v ∈ V s , resp.) for the Controller (Actor, resp.) such that u (v, resp.) constitutes a saddle-point of the Controller (Actor, resp.).
2) Additional Terminologies: Definition 4.5: Let l( x) be a matrix with M rows and K columns and entries in 0, . . . , n such that l( x) i,j is the number of components of x that are in class i and state j.
Let m( y) be a matrix with M rows and K columns with entries in 0, . . . , a( y) such that m( y) i,j is the number of components of y that are in class i and state
With 
Definition 4.7: Let R 1 (m) = max j:mi,j >0 r(j), and set
Note that R 1 (m) is the expected reward the Actor obtains when its information is y such that m( y) = m and it selects a component whose state has been revealed and whose state is the highest among those of the components whose states have been revealed. Also, R 2 (l, m, i) is the expected reward the Actor obtains when its information is y such that m( y) = m, the system state is x such that l( x) = l and it selects a component of class i uniformly among a( y, i) . Note that u is symmetric if and only if u( x 1 ) y 1 = u( x 2 ) y 2 whenever the following conditions hold: (a) l( 
Consider a m ∈ M and a class i ∈ C(m). Then, let v (m) i be the probability with which a symmetric policy v selects one (representative) component, say j, that is in class i and has been concealed, when the Actor's information state is a (representative) y such that m(
, be the total probability with which a symmetric policy v ∈ V s of the Actor selects a component which is in class j and whose state has been concealed, when the Actor's information state is a (representative) y such that m( y) = m. Thus, v selects a component whose state has been revealed with probability
2 it is sufficient to consider only sensible policies. Thus, from Observation 1, v s (m) j , j ∈ C(m) uniquely specify a symmetric saddle point strategy v ∈ V s . We prove that the following LP-ACTOR-CLASS, computes the above.
LP-ACTOR-CLASS:
Maximize 
B. Polynomial time approximations for arbitrary systems
Saddle point strategies can be computed in polynomial time when either n is a constant (using LP-CONTROLLER or LP-ACTOR) or K, M are constants (using LP-CONTROLLER-CLASS or LP-ACTOR-CLASS). The computation however becomes intractable when two or more of these parameters are large. We now prove that simple linear (O(n)) or almost linear (O(nlogn) + K) time computable policies can provably approximate the saddle point policies.
1) Approximation guarantees using a linear time computable policy for the Actor: Consider a symmetric sensible policy, denoted as v UNIFORM ∈ V s , for the Actor that (a) selects each concealed class and a revealed component with equal probabilities, i.e., V. CONCLUSIONS We have studied a leader-follower game where the actions of the leader (Controller) determine the information available to the follower (Actor). By concealing information, the leader degrades the performance of the follower that attempts to choose one out of several resources with the best state among all. We have provided a rich body of computation and approximation tools for that problem along with mathematical foundations and complexity analysis.
